In a recent article in Crisis Magazine, Eric Sammons argues, in summary and in essence, that the Catholic Social Teaching (which he prefers not to capitalise) has two limitations in terms of its binding force on the faithful.
The first limitation stems from the fact that this Doctrine is not really a Doctrine at all: it is merely a proposal for the prudent application of moral principles derived from Sacred Scripture and ecclesial Tradition to current social issues. And since this application involves technical knowledge such as economics, it can only be left to the competence of the laity.
The second limitation stems from the fact that the propositions of this teaching, contained for example in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, are mostly formulated in a generic way: while it is clear to the faithful what they must believe when it comes to the Holy Trinity or the Assumption of Mary or abortion, it would be completely uncertain and vague, for example, what the “just wage” is (par. 302 of the Compendium).
However, Sammons’ arguments seem to suggest a reductive (and therefore potentially misleading) interpretation of the Church’s Social Doctrine.
To the ‘first limitation’ mentioned above, it must be replied that this Doctrine, as taught by the Popes and Councils throughout the history of the Church (and not only since Leo XIII), constitutes authentic Magisterium. And a doctrine of the Magisterium is, depending on the case, de fide credenda, de fide tenenda or, at the very least, requires ‘religious obedience of the will and intellect’ both in terms of ‘faith’ and ‘morals’ (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Doctrinal Commentary on the Concluding Formula of the Professio fidei, 29 June 1998). Therefore, the Social Doctrine of the Church is no exception. In fact, ‘insofar as it is part of the Church’s moral teaching, the Church’s social doctrine has the same dignity and authority as her moral teaching. It is authentic Magisterium, which obligates the faithful to adhere to it. The doctrinal weight of the different teachings and the assent required are determined by the nature of the particular teachings, by their level of independence from contingent and variable elements, and by the frequency with which they are invoked’ (Compendium, par. 80). This does not mean that, since it deals with social issues, this Doctrine does not have, in a certain sense, an interdisciplinary nature and can enter into dialogue with all forms of knowledge (Compendium, par. 76 ff.). It is certainly the duty of the laity to know and implement it, if necessary with the advice of wise Pastors. Just as, ‘according to the knowledge, competence, and prestige which they possess’, the Christian faithful ‘have the right and even at times the duty to manifest to the sacred pastors their opinion on matters which pertain to the good of the Church and to make their opinion known to the rest of the Christian faithful’ (Code of Canon Law, can. 212, § 3).
With regard to the ‘second limit’, the greater or lesser precision of a formulation of the Magisterium does not in itself affect its degree of binding force. For example, even a precept of undoubted social value, such as the fourth commandment, ‘Honour your father and your mother,’ is not expressed in a detailed formulation. Some of the ways in which it is implemented may vary with time and place, but no one can doubt that the commandment is binding and, indeed, constitutes a serious obligation. This also applies, by analogy, to human norms: the principles and norms of state constitutions are usually formulated in general terms, but no one doubts that these provisions are binding and, indeed, hierarchically superior to the norms of ordinary law, which are usually more detailed.
The example of ‘just wage’ is significant. It is not simply the content of a paragraph in the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. Rather, it represents a constant teaching of the Magisterium that derives from the terrible words of the Old and New Testaments: ‘Behold, the wages you withheld from the workers who harvested your fields are crying aloud, and the cries of the harvesters have reached the ears of the Lord of hosts’ (Letter of James 5:4). For this reason, the Catechism considers the sin of refusing to pay a just wage to be among those ‘that cry to Heaven for Vengeance’ or, similarly, ‘that cry to Heaven’. Can we therefore consider the Church’s teaching on this point to be vague, generic, non-binding?
Of course, determining what constitutes a just wage in a specific case is complex and depends on many variables. Lay people involved in this issue will have to implement the biblical precept by means of the necessary technical, legal and economic studies.
It is true, as Sammons writes, that those Catholics who derive from the doctrine of just wages the need (always and in any case) for a law to establish it are mistaken. It should not be forgotten that, based on the principle of subsidiarity, this determination is primarily the responsibility of individuals and intermediate bodies. Leo XIII himself affirms this in Rerum Novarum (cf. par. 34). And it should be remembered in this regard – without being able to delve into such a vast subject here – that a useful role is often played by organisations representing employers and workers through collective bargaining.
More generally, it should be remembered that the Social Doctrine of the Church is an ‘organic corpus’ of doctrinal teachings: when it focuses on a specific theme, it presupposes a framework of principles of reflection and criteria of judgement to illuminate the directive of action in question.
Marco Ferraresi
Professor of Labour Law, University of Pavia, Italy
(Foto: di Tracy Higashi, Unsplash)
